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Abstract
Technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country to an-
other. We propose a mechanism that explains this perpetual cycle of technological
leapfrogging by incorporating knowledge spillovers into a two-country model of in-
novation including the dynamic optimization of an innitely lived consumer. In
the model, the stock of knowledge accumulates in each country over time because
of domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation, while spillovers take
place through imitation and foreign direct investment. We show that if the rate
of imitation is high, only the technologically leading country innovates in equilib-
rium (a NorthSouth regime) where leapfrogging never arises. Conversely, if the
imitation rate is su¢ ciently low, both countries innovate in equilibrium (a North
North regime), and so technological leadership may shift rst from one country
to another, and then if the international spillovers are su¢ ciently e¢ cient, may
perpetually alternate between the two along an equilibrium path.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country
to another. For instance, during the early 17th century, Venice and Spanish Lombardy
were among the technologically most advanced regions in Europe (Davids 2008, p. 2).
Over the centuries, the technological center of gravity of Europe then moved, residing
at various times in Italy, southern Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, and then
again in Germany(Mokyr 1990, p. 207). Some economic historians even claim that the
US had begun to lose its technological leadership as early as the early 1990s (Nelson and
Wright 1992).
An important question is why such economic and technological leapfrogging takes
place. An equally fundamental question is why technological leapfrogging has repeatedly
occurred. To respond to the rst question, Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) provided
an economic explanation based on major exogenous changes in technology. When such
change occurs, the new technology appears less productive for leading nations, given their
extensive experience with older technologies. Lagging nations with less experience will
then introduce the new technology. As these accumulate su¢ cient experience with the
new technology, the leapfrogging of technological leadership occurs. We may apply this
same theory to the second question by considering the perpetual cycles of leapfrogging as
responses to the perpetual changes in technology. This explanation is, however, essentially
exogenous, as it is based on macro shocks in technology. Although a variety of studies
have followed Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon, no existing work formally provides a fully
endogenous explanation that responds to both of these questions.
The aim of this analysis is to develop a fully endogenous theory that explains both
the leapfrogging of technological leadership and the perpetual cycle in technological lead-
ership as a market-driven equilibrium phenomenon. For this purpose, we focus on in-
ternational knowledge spillovers in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model of
endogenous innovation with the dynamic optimization of consumption and saving by an
innitely lived consumer. As the rms in a country develop innovations, the stock of
knowledge accumulates in the home country, and this subsequently but only partially
contributes to the accumulation of foreign knowledge because of international spillovers
through imitation and foreign direct investment.1
By regarding technological leadership as the state whereby a given country innovates
most among all countries, we demonstrate that technological leadership by that country
may shift to another country and then may perpetually alternate between the countries.
Specically, we obtain two main results. (a) If the imitation rate in a technologically
lagging country is su¢ ciently high, only the leading country innovates in equilibrium
as in a NorthSouth product-cycle model à la Krugman (1979) and Helpman (1993) (a
NorthSouth regime), in which case leapfrogging never takes place. (b) If the imitation
rate is su¢ ciently low, the world behaves like a NorthNorth model, in which both
leading and lagging countries engage in innovation (a NorthNorth regime). In this case,
technological leadership may shift over time and will perpetually move back and forth
between countries along an equilibrium path if the international knowledge spillovers are
1This approach follows a number of related theoretical models (Brezis and Tsiddon 1998; van de
Klundert and Smulders 2001; Desmet 2002). As argued by Brezis (1995), foreign capital plays a role in
industrialization and development processes. We may also accept that international capital ows, as well
as imports, are an important channel for international knowledge spillover, as discussed in the literature
(Grossman and Helpman 1991; Feenstra 1996). See Branstetter (2006) for recent empirical evidence.
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su¢ ciently e¢ cient.
The key driving force behind perpetual leapfrogging is the ability of a country to
learn from abroad. For example, a lagging country may learn much more from foreign
innovations developed in the leading country than the leading country learns from those
in the lagging country. Meanwhile, domestic innovations take place that accumulate
the knowledge stock in each country. The analysis formally shows that leapfrogging is
possible only in the NorthNorth regime, where the lagging country has a dual engine
of knowledge growth consisting of domestic innovation and foreign innovation di¤using
through imitation and foreign direct investment. If a country can learn e¢ ciently from
di¤use foreign innovations, technological leadership will perpetually alternate between
the countries.
The important mechanism that we identify in the paper is that the NorthNorth
regime is possible only when imitation in the lagging country is less active. This is
because the protability of a new innovation is su¢ ciently large that innovation pays,
even for the technologically lagging country when the imitation rate is su¢ ciently low.
Where imitation is active, the lagging country does not innovate and simply receives the
spillovers from foreign innovation through imitation and foreign direct investment. In
this NorthSouth regime, leapfrogging never arises as the spillovers by themselves can
only make the lagging South, at most, as innovative as the leading North but not more
innovative.
The striking implication of this result is that active imitation in the lagging country
hampers its ability to leapfrog the leading country, even if imitation is a channel for
knowledge spillovers. We then say that imitation is only useful for the lagging country
to catch up with the leading country. Unless the lagging country shifts to an innovative
economy in a NorthNorth regime by discouraging imitation, leapfrogging can never occur
in equilibrium.
In order to capture these cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow Shleifer
(1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999), andMatsuyama
(1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only for a single period in a discrete time
model. This assumption implies that a unit period is su¢ ciently long, which can be
somewhere around 20 years. Given that in reality, many innovated consumption goods
become obsolete before their patents expire, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
innovations are made obsolete in a single period (which is fairly long). In line with existing
studies, we assume the temporary nature of the monopoly enjoyed by innovators, which
plays a role in explaining perpetual leapfrogging.2
Our analysis relates most to studies in international economics following the work in
Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993). Most closely related is a paper by van de Klundert
and Smulders (2001), which focuses on the international capital market using an endoge-
nous growth model. By allowing for nontradable goods, capital ows, and endogenous
innovations, van de Klundert and Smulders (2001) explain the well-documented observa-
tion that a leading country (e.g., England) tends to lose its technological leadership by
becoming a rentier economy that invests in a new technologically leading country. How-
ever, as in the other related studies described below, their analysis does not address the
second question of why the leapfrogging of technology leadership produces a perpetual
cycle. In an earlier contribution, Brezis and Tsiddon (1998) show that capital mobility
2See also Iwaisako and Tanaka (2012) for endogenous cycles in a NorthSouth product-cycle model
with overlapping generations, in which innovation and imitation interact with each other to generate
perpetual uctuations in the world growth rate. In their model, however, there is no leapfrogging.
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may spur leapfrogging. Desmet (2002) extends the Ricardian model in Brezis, Krug-
man, and Tsiddon (1993) to a HeckscherOhlin framework by introducing mobile capital
and spillovers. Desmet then species a mechanism by which the most advanced country
may reinforce its dominant position by adopting the new technology if spillovers between
the old and new technologies are su¢ ciently strong, which weakens the opportunity for
lagging nations to take o¤ and leapfrog.
In a di¤erent context, the literature on industrial organization has claried the con-
ditions for leapfrogging. For example, Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales (1997) illustrate in
a model with vertical product di¤erentiation that free trade may either encourage or re-
verse quality leadership. The present study extends these existing analyses by explicitly
and formally providing a fully endogenous explanation of why leapfrogging takes place
perpetually using a single factor, namely, international knowledge spillovers. Ohyama
and Jones (1995) provide a similar explanation for leapfrogging by rms, with a focus on
comparative advantage. They argue that lagging regions typically have a comparative
advantage in the new technology as the leading country has greater experience in the
older technologies. This provides lagging regions with an opportunity to adopt the new
technology rst.
The endogenous occurrence of perpetual leapfrogging is not new in the context of price
competition between rms. For instance, Giovannetti (2001) considers a duopoly in which
rms considering innite technological adoption set prices with Bertrand competition in
the product market. Using this model, Giovannetti identies the conditions whereby rms
alternate in adopting the new technology, thereby representing a leapfrogging process. He
shows that demand conditions, such as price elasticity, play a role in determining whether
leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition.3 Lee, Kim, and Lim (2011) have
provided recent empirical support for this contention.
In demonstrating the cyclical occurrence of leapfrogging, we reveal that the dynamic
general equilibrium of the model is characterized by a simple nonlinear dynamic system in
discrete time. Along an equilibrium path generated by this system, we show that techno-
logical leadership may uctuate perpetually. Nonlinear equilibrium dynamics in discrete
time provide a useful tool for describing complicated, real-world economic phenomena
(Nishimura and Yano 2008), which may include the perpetual cycle of leapfrogging. Our
analysis extends this line of research by demonstrating the possibility of a perpetual cycle
of leapfrogging using a one-dimensional nonlinear di¤erence equation.
2 The model
Time is discrete and extends from  1 to +1. Consider two countries, A and B, which
have identical preferences and di¤er only in their initial levels of innovation productivity.
The countries are denoted by i or k (i = A; B; k = A; B), using a superscript for
variables pertaining to the production side and a subscript for those pertaining to the
consumption side.
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption goods in each period t. Each
good is indexed by j. Given that we later allow for foreign direct investment (FDI), the
country where a particular rm innovates and manufactures may change. Let  i(t) be
the set of goods that are innovated in country i in period t, and let i(t) be the set of
goods that are manufactured in country i in period t.
3See Aghion et al. (2002) for perpetual leapfrogging at the rm level.
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2.1 Consumption
In each country, an innitely lived representative consumer inelastically supplies L units
of labor for production and R&D in every period. Note that the two countries are assumed
to have equal labor forces, L. Each consumer is endowed with the same intertemporal
utility function
Ui =
1X
t=0
t lnui(t);
where  2 (0; 1) is the time preference rate. The temporary utility ui(t) is dened on
the set fA(t)[B(t)g of goods manufactured in both countries (free trade), taking the
standard DixitStiglitz form:
ui(t) =
Z
j2fA(t)[B(t)g
xi(j; t)
1 dj
 1
1 
; (1)
where xi(j; t) is the consumption of good j in country i. Parameter  2 (0; 1) denotes an
inverse measure of the elasticity of substitution. LetEi(t) 
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)xi(j; t)dj
be the spending in country i, where p(j; t) denotes the price of good j: Solving the util-
ity maximization problem in (1) leads to the demand function for good j as xi(j; t) =
p(j; t) (1=)Ei(t)=P (t)1 (1=), where P (t) is the price index.4 Aggregating these expres-
sions, we obtain the derived aggregate demand, xA(j; t) + xB(j; t)  x(j; t), as
x(j; t) =
E(t)p(j; t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
; (2)
where E(t) = EA(t) + EB(t) is the aggregate spending in period t. The price elasticity
of demand is constant at  1 for any j.
Solving the dynamic optimization of the consumers utility for consumption and saving
decisions under the intertemporal budget constraint results in the usual Euler equation
Ei(t+ 1)=Ei(t) = (1 + r(t)), where r(t) is the interest rate in period t. We then obtain
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= (1 + r(t)): (3)
2.2 Innovation, imitation, FDI, and manufacturing
A single rm innovates and monopolistically supplies each di¤erentiated consumption
good, in line with the R&D-based growth model with expanding variety (Romer 1990).5
Innovating a new good takes one period. When an R&D rm in country i invests 1=Ai(t 
1) units of labor in period t 1; it innovates a new good at the end of period t 1.6 Here
Ai(t  1) denotes the technology level in innovation for country i in period t  1:
4As is well known, the index is dened as P (t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)
1 (1=)dj
 1
1 (1=)
.
5To make the analysis as simple as possible, consistent with the standard endogenous growth model, we
basically assume that innovation and manufacturing are by the same rm. Hence, there is no adoption of
innovation or an explicit market for innovation. However, without any change in the results, it is possible
to assume a more general model with an innovation market in which innovation and manufacturing are
by di¤erent rms.
6We can extend the current deterministic innovation process to a stochastic form.
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Innovations may di¤use internationally through two channels. The rst channel is
exogenous imitation in a technologically lagging country, as in Helpman (1993). Here
innovations developed at the end of period t  1 are imitated in the subsequent period t
at a probability of : Imitated innovations are then manufactured by monopolistic rms
in the lagging country where imitation takes place. For innovations that are not imitated,
the original innovating rm sets up a production plant. The rm will then choose the
country in which to manufacture the good in order to maximize prots. In equilibrium,
as foreign prots may be greater, the rm may transfer production to a foreign country
through FDI. This is the second channel for innovation di¤usion.7
Each monopolistic rm produces x(j; t) units of good j using domestic labor as the
input. Assume that there are constant returns to scale in the production of good j and
that the productivity of labor is the same in both countries, which is normalized to be
one.8 The marginal cost is thus equal to the wage rate in country i, wi(t).
When the rm that innovates technology for good j at the end of period t 1 chooses
to manufacture in country i; captured by j 2 i(t), it maximizes monopolistic prot
in period t by setting a price at p(j; t) = wi(t)=(1   )  pi(t), taking into account the
constant price elasticity 1= according to (2). This monopolistic price does not depend on
the country for innovation, only on the country for manufacture. With this monopolistic
price pi(t), we can derive from (2) the demand and prot functions as
x(j; t) =
E(t)pi(t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
 xi(t) (4)
and
(j; t) = E(t)

pi(t)
P (t)
1 (1=)
 i(t) (5)
for j 2 i(t) (i = A; B). As rms prefer the country where prots are higher, the
discounted expectation of a value of the rm innovating in country i is expressed as
V i(t  1) = (1  ) maxf
A(t); B(t)g
1 + r(t  1)  
wi(t  1)
Ai(t  1) ; (6)
in which (1  ) denotes the probability for an innovating rm to escape imitation.
In order to capture cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion possible, we follow
Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999), and
Matsuyama (1999, 2001) by assuming that patents last only for one period. This assump-
tion implies that the length of a unit period is su¢ ciently long, which can be somewhere
around 20 years given the duration of real-world patents. Given that in reality, many
7In line with the literature on international trade and growth (Lai 1998), we do not distinguish
between the various forms of production transfer, including fully and partly owned subsidiaries and
licensing. For simplicity, we assume that imitation occurs before choosing the country in which to
manufacture, so that all innovations are under threat of imitation. However, even if we considered that
only the innovations manufactured in the lagging country may be imitated, our results shown below
would not change qualitatively.
8Here we simply consider that e¢ ciency in manufacturing normalizes across countries. We can extend
this simple setting by allowing for country-specic manufacturing e¢ ciency and endogenous technological
progress. In such an extended model, we can easily verify that the comparative advantage between R&D
and manufacturing (rather than the absolute advantage in R&D) plays an important role in perpetual
leapfrogging, although the results and their implications for perpetual leapfrogging do not fundamentally
change.
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innovated consumption goods become obsolete before their patent expires, we may as-
sume that innovations are made obsolete within a single period (which in our model is
fairly long).9 As shown below, this assumption makes the analysis tractable without any
fundamental change in the results. Finally, free entry guarantees that the net value of a
rm should not be positive in equilibrium: V i(t  1)  0 for each i.
2.3 Knowledge accumulation and spillovers
Technology in innovation Ai(t) advances with knowledge accumulation. Following Romer
(1990), we assume intertemporal knowledge spillovers in innovation: current innovations
contribute to accumulation of the stock Ai(t) of knowledge, with which the cost of inno-
vation, 1=Ai(t); reduces over time. Here, as is standard, we consider that the technology
level in innovation Ai(t) is interpreted as the knowledge stock in innovation.
The knowledge stock for a country consists of cumulative innovations of two types:
home and foreign innovations. Denote by N i(t)  R
 i(t)
dj the number of innovations
developed in country i in period t: As in Romer (1990), we assume that the knowledge
stock Ai(t) linearly depends on a sum of domestic innovations that are developed up to
the beginning of period t; i.e., N i(t  1) +N i(t  2) +   ; where N i(s) is a proxy for the
ow of knowledge generated as a by-product of the innovations in period s. Then, the
international knowledge spillovers accompany FDI or imitation, such that we assume that
each country learns from its foreign innovation inows. The knowledge stock for country
i also depends on a sum,M i(t 1)+M i(t 1)+   ; in whichM i(s)  R
j2 k(s 1)\i(s) dj is
the amount of foreign innovation that is made in period s 1 and then ows into country
i from country k in period s. Accordingly, we simply describe the knowledge stock using
Ai(t) =
tX
s= 1
 
N i(s  1) + M i(s  1) ; (7)
where  2 [0; 1] captures the e¢ ciency of the contribution of international knowledge
spillovers through foreign innovation inows to knowledge accumulation and whereby
technological progress occurs. The e¢ ciency of international knowledge spillovers in-
creases with . If  = 1, spillovers are as e¢ cient as domestic spillovers; if  = 0, there
is no learning at all from foreign innovations.
3 Perpetual leapfrogging
In this section, we prove the main result that technological leadership may uctuate over
time, thereby perpetually moving back and forth between countries. Before proceeding,
we provide a formal denition of the concept of technological leadership. Taking into
account the notion in economic history (Davids 2008),10 we refer to a country that devel-
ops the most innovations among the countries as the technological leader, and a country
that develops few innovations as a lagging country. In the present model, and as will be
9This assumption may also be justied if each innovation is interpreted as fairly specic. For example,
innovationin this model would be represented by the specic innovation associated with iPhone 4S or
smart phones instead of cell phones or information technology more generally.
10Davids (2008) considered that a country that has technological leadership plays an initiating role in
the development of new technologies across a wide variety of elds.
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made apparent later, this denition is equivalent to that in trade theory (Brezis, Krug-
man, and Tsiddon 1993), which denes leadership as the state whereby a given country
has the highest productivity among the countries. Thus, in equilibrium, country i in-
novates more if and only if its innovation productivity is higher; N i(t) > Nk(t) if and
only if Ai(t) > Ak(t): For simplicity, we use Ai(t) > Ak(t) to designate country i as the
technological leader, and we refer to any reversal of the leading position as technological
leapfrogging.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that country A is the leading country in period
t, AA(t) > AB(t) (and thus NA(t) > NB(t) to be shown in equilibrium), and we refer to
this situation as regime A. If AA(t) < AB(t) (and thus NA(t) < NB(t) to be shown in
equilibrium), we refer to it as regime B.
In any period of time, this model can be regarded as a variant of a conventional two-
good Ricardian model, where the two outputs considered are innovation and production.
Given AA(t) > AB(t), there are potentially three possible specialization patterns in period
t: (1) one in which both countries engage in manufacturing, (2) one in which both
countries engage in R&D, and (3) one in which both countries are specialized. It is useful
to dene a new variable, N(t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g dj; which is the total number of goods
manufactured in t, satisfying N(t) = NA(t  1) +NB(t  1):
3.1 NorthSouth regime
Suppose that both countries produce goods. In this case, only the leading country A
innovates, and both countries manufacture. Then we have NA(t) > 0 and NB(t) = 0;
N(t+1) = NA(t): As this situation is similar to the NorthSouth product-cycle model à la
Krugman (1979) and Helpman (1993) where only the North innovates and both the North
and the South manufacture, we may refer to this pattern as a NorthSouth regime,
in which the leading country corresponds to the North and the lagging country to the
South. As manufacturing takes place in both countries, the wages are internationally
equated, wA(t) = wB(t) = w(t), implying pi(t) = p(t) and thus xi(t) = x(t) by (4).
Only the leading country innovates, so the free-entry condition holds as V A(t) = 0 >
V B(t): By (5) and (6), with the Euler equation (3), V A(t) = 0 implying
(1  ) E(t)
NA(t)
=
w(t)
AA(t)
; (8)
where use has been made of NA(t) = N(t+1). Equation (8) ensures that the discounted
expectation value of an innovation (left-hand side) and the cost (right-hand side) are
balanced. The condition of 0 > V B(t) implies AA(t) > AB(t): This is an important
condition ensuring that country A is the leading country in the NorthSouth regime.
We can describe the labor market-clearing conditions as
L =
NA(t)
AA(t)
+ A(t)N(t) x(t) (9)
for the leading country A and
L = B(t)N(t) x(t) (10)
for the lagging country B; in which i(t) denotes an endogenous fraction of goods man-
ufactured in country i in all goods N(t); with
P
i=A;B 
i(t) = 1: Because xi(t) = x(t) 
8
(1  )E(t)= (w(t)N(t)) by (4), the labor conditions (9) and (10) can be combined into a
single world labor constraint as
2L =
NA(t)
AA(t)
+ (1  )E(t)
w(t)
: (11)
The left-hand side is the world supply of labor, and the right-hand side is the world
demand for labor from both the innovation sector in leading country A and the manu-
facturing sectors in both countries.
We can eliminate the term E(t)=w(t) from the world labor market-clearing condition
(11), using the free-entry condition (8). Then, the ow of innovation in period t is derived
as
NA(t) = AA(t)
2L(1  )
1 +  (1  ) ; (12)
where   =(1 ): Equation (12) shows that the innovation ow NA(t) increases with
the knowledge stock AA(t) and the time preference , and decreases with the elasticity of
substitution  1: By (8) and (10), with (12), the fraction of goods that are manufactured
in each country is obtained as
A(t) =
1 (1  )
2
and B(t) =
1 +  (1  )
2
: (13)
To ensure that the leading country A manufactures, i.e., A(t) > 0; we need to impose
(1  ) < 1:11 (14)
This requires that the imitation rate  is high, the time preference  is small, and the
elasticity of substitution  1 is high.
So far, we have four important conditions: two inequalities and two equations char-
acterizing the NorthSouth regime. Inequality (14) guarantees that the world falls into
the NorthSouth regime. Inequality AA(t) > AB(t) requires that, in the NorthSouth
regime, country A becomes the leading country. Equations (12) and (13) determine the
innovation ow and the fractions of manufactured goods, respectively.
It is important to discern the two roles for imitation in the NorthSouth regime. First,
as (12) shows, the innovation ow NA(t) decreases with the imitation rate : This reects
the usual negative e¤ect of imitation, which reduces the expected value of innovation.12
Second, as (13) shows, the manufacturing fraction A(t) in the leading countryA increases
with the imitation rate : This may seem odd at rst, but it is due to the coexistence of
FDI and imitation, as in Lai (1998). More specically, imitation in the lagging country
B discourages not only innovation but also FDI into the lagging country B.13 Then, the
11This condition also guarantees that the resource condition for the leading country A; NA(t)=AA(t) <
L; is satised.
12This negative relationship between imitation and innovation is intuitive but di¤ers from that in
Helpman (1993) where an increase in the imitation rate in the South increases the innovation rate in the
North. This di¤erence basically arises from the presence of endogenous FDI in our model. In Helpmans
model, imitation shifts manufacturing from the North to the South, which opens up more resources for
innovation in the North. In our model, as imitation increases manufacturing in the North, A(t); through
the mechanism described later, the relationship can be negative, in line with Lais (1998) result.
13The following specic mechanism works in our model. Imitation decreases the expected protability
and thus the demand for innovation. The labor demand from innovation declines, so that the wage rate
in the leading country tends to decrease, discouraging the incentive for rms in the leading country to
undertake FDI in the lagging country.
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decreased innovation and FDI result in a shift of resources in the leading country A from
innovation to manufacturing, resulting in an increase in A(t):
In what follows, we demonstrate that in the present NorthSouth regime, leapfrogging
never takes place. even if the spillovers are completely e¢ cient ( = 1). To do so, from
(7), we can easily write the ow of the knowledge stock as
Ai(t+ 1)  Ai(t) = N i(t) + M i(t): (15)
By (12) and (15), the growth of knowledge can be expressed as follows:
AA(t+ 1) =

2L(1  )
1 +  (1  ) + 1

AA(t) (16)
and
AB(t+ 1) = MB(t) + AB(t): (17)
As AA(t) is given by history, (16) fully determines the growth of knowledge for the
leading country A. Apparently, (17) does not determine AB(t+1) without any additional
historical assumption because the level ofMB(t) = B(t)N(t) depends on N(t) = NA(t 
1)+NB(t 1); which is determined by innovation activities made in the previous period,
t  1. So far, we do not have any assumption on innovation activities in period t  1 or
before. Nevertheless, as shown in our rst theorem, regardless of innovation activities in
the past, leapfrogging never takes place in the NorthSouth regime.14
Theorem 1 (No Leapfrogging in the NorthSouth Regime) Suppose (1  ) <
1: Then, under the innitely lived agents dynamic optimization, the world is in the North
South regime, where only the leading country innovates. In this case, leapfrogging never
takes place in equilibrium, and the roles of the countries as the leading North and the
lagging South never reverse.
Proof. By (14), (1   ) < 1 ensures the NorthSouth regime. By (13), MB(t) =
(1 +  (1  ))N(t)=2: (a) Assume AA(t 1) > AB(t 1): By the expression of NA(t 1)
in (12), with AA(t   1) = NA(t   1) + AA(t) from (15), substituting N(t) = NA(t   1)
into (17) derives
AB(t+ 1) = AA(t)
L(1  ) (1 +  (1  ))
(2L+ 1) (1  ) + 1 + A
B(t): (18)
From (16) and (18), we can show that AA(t + 1) > AB(t + 1) holds so long as AA(t) >
AB(t); noting (1  ) < 1 and  < 1: (b) Assume AA(t  1) < AB(t  1): By symmetry,
noting N(t) = NB(t  1), the analogous procedures derive
AB(t+ 1) =

L(1  ) (1 +  (1  ))
(2L+ 1) (1  ) + 1 + 1

AB(t): (19)
14Considering (15), one may conjecture that if NA(t) and NB(t) were zero, AA(t + 1) < AB(t + 1)
might hold by taking a su¢ ciently large MB(t): Leapfrogging may then be able to occur simply through
spillovers MB(t). However, this conjecture does not make sense. First, this example (of such a large
MB(t)) is not feasible in the space that we consider in the present model. Second, and more importantly,
innovation in country A; NA(t  1) =MB(t); not only contributes to the foreign knowledge; AB(t+1);
through spillovers but also increases the domestic knowledge AA(t) in the previous period. This implies
that AA(t + 1) includes NA(t   1) = MB(t) since it includes AA(t): As NA(t   1) = MB(t) becomes
large, by (7), AA(t + 1) increases at a higher rate than, or at least the same rate as, AB(t + 1): So, in
this case of NA(t) = NB(t) = 0, for any large MB(t); AA(t+ 1) < AB(t+ 1) is not possible. Thus, as
long as we discern an identical equilibrium path, spillovers MB(t) by themselves cannot cause a reversal
of AA(t) > AB(t):
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From (16) and (19), AA(t + 1) > AB(t + 1) holds so long as AA(t) > AB(t); given
(1  ) < 1 and  < 1: This proves that AA(t) > AB(t) cannot be reversed for the
subsequent period when (1  ) < 1; whether either country is a leading country in the
previous period t  1:
We now elaborate upon the intuition why the NorthSouth economy cannot experience
leapfrogging. There are potentially two sources of leapfrogging: knowledge growth from
domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation. In the NorthSouth regime,
however, the lagging South (countryB) only has spillovers fromMB(t) foreign innovations
developed in the leading North (country A). No domestic innovations take place in the
lagging country. Given that the leading North also gains from these innovations ofMB(t)
(which are included in AA(t)) even more e¢ ciently than, or at least equally to, the lagging
South, the natural property works that spillovers alone can only make the lagging South
as innovative as, but not more innovative than, the leading North. Thus, in the North
South regime, leapfrogging never takes place. As shown later, if the lagging country not
only has spillovers from the leading country but also innovates by itself, leapfrogging will
be possible.
Why then does the world fall into the NorthSouth regime when (1  ) < 1? This
condition intuitively requires that the expected discounted value for an innovation is
fairly low. That is, it is too low for the lagging country B to innovate by itself.15 In other
words, where (1   ) is higher, say, because of a lower imitation rate , the expected
benet from an innovation would be higher and thus innovation would be protable,
even for rms in the lagging country. Finally, we may summarize this by stating that:
when imitation in the lagging country is active, the world enters the NorthSouth regime
in which leapfrogging does not take place because the lagging country does not innovate
alone.
3.2 An illustration
To illustrate further the international dynamics of knowledge in the NorthSouth regime,
we assume that the leading country A has retained leadership in the past; i.e., NA(s) >
0 = NB(s) and thus AA(s) > AB(s) for s = t; t  1;   : This consideration is reasonable
given that Theorem 1 shows that leapfrogging never takes place in the NorthSouth
regime. The growth of knowledge follows (16) and (18) for any s  t: Dene  (t) =
AA(t)=(AA(t) + AB(t)); which stands for the knowledge ratio for country A: We can
derive the dynamic system for  (t) as follows. Noting AA(t) > AB(t),
 (t+ 1) =
(a1 + 1) (t)
1 + (a1 + a2) (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; 1); (20)
where a1 and a2 are positive numbers determined by ; ; ; and L:16 By applying the
above procedures to the case of  (t) 2 (0; 0:5) where country B is the leading country,
15For ; a higher imitation rate  results in a smaller expectation for innovation rms to obtain prot.
For  in ; a lower time preference  results in a higher interest rate r(t); decreasing the discounted
value for the prot. For  1 in ; a higher elasticity of substitution  1 implies a lower markup ratio
(1=1  ) and thus a lower prot (t):
16The formal denitions are:
a1  2L(1 )1+(1 ) and a2  L(1 )(1+(1 ))1+(1 )(2L+1) :
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we can easily derive the following dynamic system:
 (t+ 1) =
(1  a2) (t) + a2
1 + (1   (t)) (a1 + a2) for  (t) 2 (0; 0:5): (21)
Note that a1 < 1 and a2 < 1 if (1   ) < 1: We thus can verify that so long as
(1  ) < 1; the steady state is unique and higher than 0:5 for (20) and lower than 0:5
for (21).
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram for systems (20) and (21) with their steady
states,  A and  

B. As shown, any path starting in the situation where country A (B)
is the leading country stably converges to a steady state;  (s) > (<)0:5 for all s > t if
 (t) > (<)0:5: Thus, this phase diagram visually shows that no leapfrogging occurs in
the NorthSouth regime.
3.3 NorthNorth regime
Let us now consider the situation where both countries innovate (pattern (2)), which is
realized when (1   ) > 1, as explained below. In this case, only the lagging country,
B; manufactures. Then we have NA(t) > 0 and NB(t) > 0; N(t + 1) = NA(t) +NB(t):
In contrast to the NorthSouth regime, both countries behave like the North in the sense
that the North generally innovates. Thus, we may refer to this specialization pattern
as a NorthNorth regime. Because innovation takes place in both countries, by the
free-entry condition V A(t) = V B(t) = 0; the wages satisfy wA(t)=AA(t) = wB(t)=AB(t).
Manufacturing takes place only in country B; so that A(t + 1) < B(t + 1) must hold,
which implies wA(t) > wB(t): Thus, the following inequality must hold in this case:
AA(t) > AB(t):
Taking into account the monopolistic price pB(t) = wB= (1  ) in (5) and (6), the
free-entry condition of V i(t) = 0 with the Euler equation (3) implies
 (1  ) E(t)
NA(t) +NB(t)
=
wi(t)
Ai(t)
(22)
for each i: The interpretation of (22) is similar to that of (8) in the NorthSouth regime.
In the NorthNorth regime, the labor market-clearing conditions are given by L =
NA(t)=AA(t) for the leading country A and L =
 
NB(t)=AB(t)

+ N(t)xB(t) for the
lagging country B; in which xB(t) = (1   ) E(t)
N(t)wB(t)
holds by using (4) and pB(t) =
wB= (1  ). With (22), these labor conditions determine the innovation ows as
NA(t) = LAA(t) (23)
and
NB(t) =
1
 (1  ) + 1
 
(1  )LAB(t)  LAA(t) : (24)
Equation (24) shows that the innovation ow in the lagging country NB(t) increases
with the domestic knowledge stock AB(t) but decreases with the foreign knowledge stock
AA(t): In order to ensure that the lagging country also innovates, NB(t) > 0; by (24), we
need to assume
(1  ) > A
A(t)
AB(t)
> 1; (25)
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which requires that the international technological gap, AA(t)=AB(t); is not very large.
To allow (25) to be feasible, we need to impose (1  ) > 1.
What if the knowledge gap, AA(t)=AB(t); is larger than (1  )? The specialization
pattern then goes to case (3), where both countries are specialized such that the leading
country innovates and the lagging country manufactures. We refer to this as a full North
South regime. In this case, the wage rate in the lagging country is determined by its labor
market-clearing condition L = N(t)xB(t) as wB(t) = (1  )E(t)=L: The innovation ow
in the leading country A NA(t) does not change from (23) while that in the lagging
country B is zero (NB(t) = 0). The condition for the full NorthSouth regime is
AA(t)
AB(t)
> (1  ) > 1: (26)
To prove that leapfrogging may take place in the NorthNorth regime, we leave the
full NorthSouth regime to Section 2.4 by imposing (25). In proving this, we suppose
that country A retains leadership for two consecutive periods. That is, (25) holds for two
periods, t and t 1: This implies that spilloversMB(t) are equal toNA(t 1) = LAA(t 1)
because innovations developed by country A in period t 1 all ow to the lagging country
B:
By substituting (23) and (24) into (15) , with MA(t) = 0 and MB(t) = LAA(t   1);
the growth of knowledge in the NorthNorth regime follows
AA(t+ 1) = LAA(t)| {z }
NA(t): domestic innovation
+ AA(t); (27)
AB(t+ 1) =
 (1  )LAB(t)  LAA(t)
 (1  ) + 1| {z }
NB(t): domestic innovation
+
L
L+ 1
AA(t)| {z }
MB(t): spillovers
+ AB(t): (28)
What is important here is that in the NorthNorth regime, the lagging country B has
two sources of knowledge growth, namely, domestic innovation NB(t) and spillovers from
foreign innovation MB(t); which sharply contrast with the NorthSouth regime where
the lagging country does not innovate. By combining (27) and (28), we derive the inter-
national dynamics of knowledge as
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L
L+1
 (t) +

(1 )L
(1 )+1 + 1
 ; (29)
given 0:5 <  (s) < (1 )
1+(1 ) for s = t; t  1 coming from (25).
Using (29), the following theorem formally proves the perpetual occurrence of leapfrog-
ging as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Theorem 2 (Perpetual Leapfrogging in the NorthNorth Regime) Suppose (1  ) >
AA(s)=AB(s) > 1 for s = t; t 1: Then, under dynamic optimization by the innitely lived
agent, the world is in the NorthNorth regime in period t, where both the leading country
and the lagging country innovate. In this case, neither country may be able to retain its
technological leadership for innite sequential periods; i.e., leapfrogging may take place
repeatedly and perpetually along an equilibrium path. Specically, this occurs if
 >
2 (L+ 1)
 (1  ) + 1 : (30)
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Proof. First, (25) ensures the NorthNorth regime. The steady state of system (29) is
uniquely given by
  =
1

L+ 1
 (1  ) + 1 ;
which is less than 0:5 so long as (30) holds. If   < 0:5; given (29),  (t) will stably
decrease and eventually go below 0:5: This shows that when country A has leadership
for two periods (t and t   1), it can never retain its leadership for innite sequential
periods. Put di¤erently, technological leadership is always temporary. By symmetry, it
is straightforward to show the opposite case where country B initially has leadership for
two periods. This proves the occurrence of perpetual leapfrogging, taking into account
the fact that for the case where a country initially has leadership for just one period,
either the country retains leadership for two periods or is immediately leapfrogged.
Noting (30), we can see that Theorem 2 has an important implication concerning the
likelihood of perpetual leapfrogging.
Proposition 1 Leapfrogging may take place repeatedly and perpetually in the North
North regime if the e¢ ciency of international spillovers  is higher and/or if the imitation
rate  is lower.
The key driving force behind perpetual leapfrogging is the dual growth engine of a
lagging country. In the NorthNorth regime, which results from a lower imitation rate, the
lagging country both innovates and manufactures. Thus, the lagging countrys knowledge
accumulates not only through its own innovations but also through the ow of spillovers
from the leading countrys innovations. In this sense, the growth engine of knowledge in
the lagging country is dual: innovating by itself and learning from abroad.17 Conversely
the leading country only innovates. Although it innovates faster than the lagging country,
the knowledge growth in the leading country is driven only by domestic innovations. This
creates the possibility of leapfrogging.
Needless to say, this is an extreme case as specialization takes place in the present
model, which is a dynamic version of the Ricardian model. In reality, the leading country
also manufactures foreign innovations (those in the lagging country) and may also learn
from them. Therefore, we consider that this model captures only one particular aspect of
real-world behavior. That is, lagging countries may have an advantage in international
technology competition with the leading country because they can learn from the leaders
active innovation as well as their own experience in innovation. However, this analysis
does formally show that in a two-country model with dynamic optimization of the in-
nitely lived consumer, if a country can learn su¢ ciently from the foreign country in a
NorthNorth regime where imitation is less active in the lagging country, technological
leadership perpetually alternates between the countries.18
17Recall that in the NorthSouth regime, knowledge growth in the lagging country results only from
foreign innovations, in which leapfrogging is not possible (Theorem 1).
18Given the historical fact that technology leadership has often shifted between countries, it is impor-
tant to provide an extended case comprising more than two countries. We can then demonstrate that
three or more countries on an equilibrium path can perpetually experience various forms of leapfrog-
ging including, for example, growth miracles (Matsuyama 2007), in which the least productive country
leapfrogs all rival countries with higher productivity levels in a single burst. Such growth miracles may
take place sporadically or consecutively or in some complex combination. See Furukawa (2012) for a
formal analysis.
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3.4 An illustration
To obtain a graphic understanding, we again use a phase diagram. However, the cong-
uration of the phase diagram depends on the history, i.e., which country was a leading
country in the previous period. As this is simply a problem of visual complication, to
clarify the illustration, we assume that innovation activities are completed within one
period. Thus, the innovation value in (6) should be replaced by
V i(t) = (1  )maxfA(t); B(t)g   wi(t)=Ai(t): (31)
Dene ^  (1 )
1 +(1 ) : Noting that ^ > 0:5 holds if (25) or (26) holds, we can describe
the international dynamics of knowledge as follows.19
 (t+ 1) = ( (t)) 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
L+1

L+  (t)
1  (t)

for  (t) 2 (0; 1  ^)
(^ (1 ))L+(1+(1 )L) (t)
^L+1+L(1  (t)) for  (t) 2 (1  ^; 0:5)
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+^L+L (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; ^)
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+(1+)L (t)
for  (t) 2 (^; 1)
: (32)
The equilibrium dynamic system  is autonomous and nonlinear. Figure 2 depicts
the phase diagram of system  for  < 2(1   ^). There are two steady states, both
of which are stable. For all initial points, technological leadership can never alternate
internationally. In this case of  < 2(1  ^) where the spillovers are less e¢ cient (small )
and imitation is more active (high  and thus small ^), the result is essentially identical
to that in the NorthSouth regime; that is, no leapfrogging takes place.
There are two subcases with (a)  < ^
 1
(1  ^) and (b) ^ 1(1  ^) < : In case (a),
even if the advantage of the leading country is initially very small ( (t) is around 0:5),
the knowledge gap stably widens and the world economy nally converges to the steady
state ( i ) as the full NorthSouth regime without experiencing any leapfrogging. The
two countries, even though both are North initially, will eventually split into North and
South, in which the outcome is ultimately determined by the initial (slight) knowledge
di¤erence. In case (b),  (t) converges to the steady state ( i ) in the NorthNorth regime,
in which case both countries can be North in the long run.
From this fact, we may state that in the world where leapfrogging never occurs, the
initially lagging country eventually becomes the South, even though its initial disadvan-
tage in knowledge stock is very small, if  < ^
 1
(1   ^) holds; i.e., if the e¢ ciency of
international spillovers  is lower and the imitation rate  is higher. If  is not very low
and  is not very high, even the lagging country can become innovative in the long run.
Most interestingly, Figure 3 depicts a typical path for the case in which  > 2(1  ^).
Given that no steady state exists, the international knowledge fraction  (t) will move
perpetually back and forth between the two regimes (0; 0:5) and (0:5; 1). Finally, note
that the condition of perpetual leapfrogging in the simplied model,  > 2(1   ^); is
analogous to (30).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we developed a two-region endogenous innovation model with the dynamic
optimization of the innitely lived consumer, in which knowledge di¤uses internationally
19See an unpublished appendix to this paper available from the author upon request.
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through imitation and foreign direct investment. The major nding is that technological
leadership may shift internationally, perpetually moving back and forth between countries
if imitation is less active and the spillovers are more e¢ cient. Specically, if imitation is
active, in equilibrium, the world moves to a NorthSouth regime where only the leading
country innovates. In this regime, leapfrogging never arises. If imitation is less active, in
equilibrium, a NorthNorth regime arises where both countries innovate. In this regime,
leapfrogging perpetually takes place along an equilibrium path if international spillovers
are su¢ ciently e¢ cient.
Our result is novel in at least two aspects. The rst is to show that perpetual leapfrog-
ging can occur along an equilibrium path, which is possible only in the NorthNorth
regime with e¢ cient spillovers. The second is to perceive the endogenous selection of
NorthSouth and NorthNorth models as a market equilibrium phenomenon. That is,
the world works like a NorthNorth (NorthSouth) economy when imitation is less (more)
active. The most striking implication is that active imitation in the lagging country may
hamper its ability to leapfrog the leading country, even if imitation is an essential channel
for knowledge spillovers. We then suggest that imitation is only useful for the lagging
country to catch up with the leading country. Only when the lagging country shifts to
an innovative economy in a NorthNorth regime by discouraging imitation, leapfrogging
can occur in equilibrium.
To grasp the essence of perpetual leapfrogging, we have left some important issues to
discuss for future work. First, we have conceptualized essentially homogeneous countries.
Departing from this, we would be able to investigate various patterns of leapfrogging, in-
cluding one-time or terminal leapfrogging. Second, given heterogeneous countries, to con-
sider which country nally prevails may attract policy-related researchers to leapfrogging
issues. For example, the government of a country may a¤ect the process of leapfrogging
by means of policy, including subsidies, tari¤s, competition policies, and institutional
reforms. In pursuing this line of research, it could be interesting to investigate the Nash
equilibrium in a policy game where each government maximizes domestic welfare. Third,
as an alternative, it may be fruitful to relate the degree of international spillovers to
the legal protection of intellectual property, a prominent issue in international relations.
Strengthening the domestic level of intellectual property protection may or may not de-
lay the timing of a county to leapfrog (or be leapfrogged). It may even deprive it of
the opportunity to leapfrog. Finally, it would also be important to extend our discrete-
time analysis to continuous time. In this study, leapfrogging is considered a nonlinear,
discrete phenomenon, which would help understanding of the fundamental mechanism of
leapfrogging. One may instead consider the leapfrogging mechanism in a continuous-time
model. One possible way forward would be to focus on technological complementarity
between countries. Spillovers from the leading country then combine with the backward
technology of the lagging country, so leapfrogging should be more likely.
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Unpublished Appendix
In the NorthNorth regime:
(A) Assume (1 )
1  >
AA(t)
AB(t)
> 1: The free-entry condition (22) becomes
 (1  ) E(t)
NA(t) +NB(t)
=
wi(t)
Ai(t)
:
Given the labor condition for the leading country A, we have
NA(t) = LAA(t):
By the labor condition for the lagging country, L =
 
NB(t)=AB(t)

+
 
NA(t) +NB(t)

xB(t);
with xB(t) = (1 )E(t)
(NA(t)+NB(t))wB(t)
; we thus have
NB(t) =
(1 )
1  LA
B(t)  LAA(t)
1 + (1 )
1 
:
Noting MB(t) = NA(t) here, by (15), we can have the dynamic system as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L (t) + ^L+ 1
for  (t) 2

0:5; ^

;
where ^  (1 )
1 +(1 ) :Note that ^ > 0:5 holds in the NorthNorth regime with

1  (1  ) >
1:
(B) Assume 1 
(1 ) <
AA(t)
AB(t)
< 1: We can also derive
 (t+ 1) =
(^ + (  1))L+ (1 + (1  )L) (t)
^L+ 1 + L (1   (t)) for  (t) 2

1  ^; 0:5

:
In the full NorthSouth regime:
(A) Assume A
A(t)
AB(t)
> (1 )
1  > 1: The leading country innovates following
NA(t) = LAA(t):
The lagging country receives spilloversMB(t) = NA(t):20 Then, the knowledge dynamics
is as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (t)
for  (t) 2

^; 1

:
(B) Assume A
A(t)
AB(t)
< 1 
(1 ) < 1: We can easily have
 (t+ 1) =
1
L+ 1

L+
 (t)
1   (t)

for  (t) 2

0; 1  ^

:
20By using the labor market condition for the lagging country B and the free-entry condition, we can
easily verify that
AA(t)
AB(t)
>
wA(t)
wB(t)
=
 (1  )
1   > 1
holds.
